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Abstract
In the last decade UN peace operations have begun to explicitly seek ‘stabilization’ 
in the states to which they are deployed. Despite the term being included in the titles 
of four missions, three of which are amongst the four largest operations currently 
deployed, and stabilization activities being included in the mandates, there is no 
UN-wide interpretation of the term. Instead, the mandates include varying activities 
under the heading of stabilization depending on the mission. Concurrently, stabili-
zation missions have seen the use of language such as ‘robust posture’ and ‘active 
patrolling’, increased logistical capabilities from Western military hardware, the 
encroachment of a counter-terrorism rhetoric, operations alongside host state forces, 
and an emphasis on (re)establishing the rule of law. This article examines the legal 
effects these trends could have. Due to the competing interests introduced by stabi-
lization it is suggested that the mandates issued by the UN Security Council require 
further clarity and harmonisation to prevent the pursuit of lasting peace from being 
undermined.
Keywords UN peacekeeping · Stabilization · Counter-terrorism · UN Security 
Council · International humanitarian law · Use of force · Responsibility of 
international organizations
The research for this article was completed in November 2018. Consequently, the article does 
not purport to reflect any more recent changes in the course of the conflicts discussed. All online 
resources were last accessed on 30 January 2019.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, stabilization has become entrenched in the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council’s work on peace operations.1 However, the UN itself is yet to out-
line an organisation-wide understanding of the term. Missions in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and the Central African Republic (CAR) have 
linked the term with offensive force, ‘robust’ force, counter-terrorism, and increased 
cooperation with host state forces. However, stabilization has also led to UN atten-
tion on returning basic services, building the capacity of the host state to enforce 
the rule of law, and an inclusive peace process. Public international lawyers have 
seldom addressed the adoption of stabilization by peace operation mandates despite 
the potential legal effects and the overall trajectory of the international security sys-
tem. In light of stabilization mandates, what is needed is to ascertain the next steps 
in developing mandates which are flexible yet consistent, respond to the needs of 
individuals in harm’s way, but do not undermine the UN’s ability to maintain inter-
national peace and security, and ensure adherence to humanitarian and human rights 
laws.
Current debates in academia and policy circles reflect a need to re-evaluate UN 
peacekeeping doctrine to assess the effect these doctrinal shifts have had in recent 
years. Instead of focusing on one issue, such as a robustness, this article fills a gap 
in recent stabilization discourse by taking a broader scope. Four elements of the 
missions that are evident after reviewing documentation on stabilization missions 
are set out below. Namely, the effect of ‘robustness’, counter-terrorism, cooperation 
with the host state, and the goal of entrenching the rule of law and ending impunity. 
These four elements reveal tensions which future mandates from the UN Security 
Council will need to rectify.
This article argues that if the UN wishes to engage in fighting an enemy alongside 
the host state and international forces then what needs to be addressed is harmonis-
ing the competing interests in the mandate to ensure the mission still seeks an inclu-
sive peace process and effective national reconciliation. At the moment, stabilization 
mandates are fraught with risks that teeter between offensive and defensive force 
and could alter the legal footing of missions, particularly with regards to humanitar-
ian law (IHL). The UN Security Council’s current approach, where stabilization is 
used flippantly to mean a great number of mission activities depending on the mis-
sion context, risks undermining other areas of a mission’s work and muddying the 
waters for the international community on what peace operations seek to achieve 
under the UN Security Council’s responsibility to maintain international peace and 
security.
The article is based on an extensive review of UN documentation on the United 
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) 
1 This article typically uses the term ‘peace operations’ as opposed to ‘peacekeeping’. ‘Peace operations’ 
is an inclusive term which encompasses a range of mission types. Peacekeeping is used in this article to 
denote a more traditional interpretation where there is peace to keep or where discussing the principles 
or doctrine of peacekeeping as distinct from peace enforcement.
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and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the 
Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and thus mainly derives examples from 
those missions. First, the definitions of stabilization used by the United Kingdom 
(UK) and United States (US) are outlined. A blending of these two definitions 
reveals the UN’s current usage of the strategy.2 Second, the four key aspects of sta-
bilization mentioned above are discussed drawing on examples from MINUSMA, 
MINUSCA, and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). While it is arguably positive that the 
UN recognises the need to take proactive, preventative steps to minimise harm to 
civilians, there are nevertheless tensions visible in the current mandates. It is dis-
cussed below how ‘robust’ force toes a fine line between peacekeeping and peace 
enforcement that risks the missions becoming a party to conflicts under IHL. In 
addition, the UN’s increased concern with counter-terrorism is an activity the UN 
is ill-prepared for and could entangle the organisation in protracted conflicts against 
an elusive enemy. Cooperation with the host state presents the prospect that the UN 
could be deemed responsible for aiding internationally wrongful acts committed by 
host state forces and further compounds the risk that the local population could lose 
trust in the traditionally impartial UN personnel. The final key area of stabilization 
mandates, advancing the rule of law and ending impunity, holds prospects for build-
ing a lasting peace but could be detrimentally affected by a counter-terrorism rheto-
ric or increased war-fighting.
2  What Does Stabilization Mean?
The last decade has seen a seismic shift in how UN peace operations are mandated 
and the situations to which they are deployed. In the 2000s the majority of peace-
keepers were utilised in post-conflict situations where a peace agreement was in 
place. Conversely, two-thirds of peacekeepers in 2015 were deployed to ongoing 
conflicts.3 Doctrinally however, there have been no major internal policy re-evalu-
ations of peace operations similar to the Capstone Doctrine in 2008 to review and 
document the shifts in practice. What is evident though is that operations in recent 
years have been given more robust mandates where force is used to pursue the goal 
of stabilization.4 This section does not purport to provide a comprehensive definition 
of stabilization. Instead, the section looks at how stabilization has been interpreted 
by two permanent members of the UN Security Council and how the concept is por-
trayed in academia. The section gives the necessary background before the article 
turns to analyse the risks associated with stabilization.
In 2015 the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Opera-
tions (HIPPO) stated, ‘[t]he term “stabilization” has a wide range of interpreta-
tions, and the Panel believes the usage of that term by the United Nations requires 
2 Curran and Holtom (2015), pp. 3, 4.
3 De Coning (2015), p. 18; see also Peter (2015).
4 Karlsrud (2017a), p. 3.
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clarification’.5 Some UN officials say that no specific significance should be given to 
the fact that some missions have been designated ‘stabilization’ missions.6 The UN 
has not formally adopted a definition of the term or clear policy guidelines on what 
activities a stabilization mission will entail. In fact, the operations that use the term 
stabilization have a range of different activities in their mandates. The adoption of 
stabilization has been said to be a ‘hodge-podge’ of words and ‘[t]he danger is that 
the terminological imprecision surrounding “stabilization” creates a meta-category; 
full of buzzwords but empty of meaning’.7
With no agreement on the topic at the UN it is necessary to look at the states 
influencing the UN Security Council’s decision-making process which arguably 
underpins this turn to stabilization. Two members of the P5 have developed a deeper 
understanding of stabilization, namely the UK and US, and it has been argued that 
a shared understanding exists between NATO states.8 The adoption of stabilization 
policies by the UK and US is important due to the fact that the UK, US, and France 
(the so-called P3) have become pen-holders on most resolutions relating to UN 
peace operations and these countries have shared ‘stabilization’ experiences from 
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.9
The UK Stabilisation Unit informs its deployees to UN missions that it is com-
mon to find there is no shared and coordinated vision of stabilization.10 The UK 
Stabilisation Unit defines stabilisation as an approach,
…which is designed to protect and promote legitimate political authority, 
using a combination of integrated civilian and military actions to reduce vio-
lence, re-establish security and prepare for longer-term recovery by building 
an enabling environment for structural stability.11
The use of an integrated approach seeking long-term recovery is similar to that of 
other twenty-first century operations. However, a core difference is the identifica-
tion of a legitimate authority which has traditionally been avoided in peace opera-
tions. The UK Stabilisation Unit further stresses that in a destabilised state there 
will likely be a number of parties vying for control through force.12 As a result, a 
decision will need to be taken with regard to who with and how to work in the envi-
ronment. Actors engaged in stabilization will necessarily need to determine who the 
legitimate authority is they wish to give support with care and attention to ensuring 
8 Curran and Holtom (2015), p. 3.
9 De Coning (2018), p. 87.
10 UK Stabilisation Unit, ‘Working in United Nations Missions: Deployee Guide’ (October 2014), http://
www.sclr.stabi lisat ionun it.gov.uk/publi catio ns/deplo yee-guide -serie s/492-deplo yee-guide -un/file, p. 23.
11 UK Stabilisation Unit, ‘The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation (2014)’ (May 2014), http://
sclr.stabi lisat ionun it.gov.uk/publi catio ns/stabi lisat ion-serie s/487-uk-appro ach-to-stabi lisat ion-2014, p. 2.
12 Ibid., p. 2.
5 UN Security Council and UN General Assembly, ‘Identical letters dated 17 June 2015 from the Secre-
tary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Coun-
cil’ (17 June 2015), A/70/95–S/2015/446, para. 114.
6 De Coning (2018), p. 87.
7 Mac Ginty (2012), p. 24.
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the legitimate authority is a ‘locally and/or nationally-owned and led authority’.13 
The UK focuses on a ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilization which is civilian-led 
with the support of the military.14
The US takes a narrower approach to stabilization where it is understood the 
intervening force defeats an insurgency while at the same time entrenching support 
for a domestically owned transition towards peace and the capacity building of soci-
ety to be resilient to the causes of conflict.15 Under this approach, the goal of stabi-
lization is to support the legitimate authority in securing the monopoly on the use of 
force to enable the authority to protect its population.16 The similarities between the 
approaches are the identification of a legitimate authority and the capacity building 
of the authority to be able to deflect spoilers to peace. The use of force in this man-
ner, to counter spoilers in support of a legitimate authority, typically the host state, 
has been described as ‘bordering on counterinsurgency’.17
UN missions that include ‘stabilization’ in their title typically include a number 
of shared hallmarks in their mandates that are similar to the two approaches above. 
First, they are mandated to support the extension of state authority.18 Second, they 
operate alongside state forces and actively build the capacity of those forces.19 
Third, they use varying degrees of proactive, ‘robust’ force to prevent attacks on 
themselves and those they are mandated to protect.20 Lastly, they have mandates 
to support (re)establishing the rule of law.21 These similarities though have not yet 
been formulated into an UN-wide understanding of stabilization. Within academia it 
has been postulated that there is a distinct trend of stabilization missions being asked 
to contain aggressors, enforce law and order, and protect civilians.22 Furthermore, it 
has been argued by Curran and Holtom that the UN’s approach to stabilization is 
a marrying of the UK and US understandings of the concept.23 That is to say (a) 
force is used to deter or displace armed groups following the US interpretation and 
(b) civilian led peacebuilding activities, aimed at entrenching the rule of law and 
re-establishing the state as the legitimate authority, take place in the power vacuum 
13 Ibid., p. 3.
14 Curran and Holtom (2015), pp. 3, 4; see also, Gordon (2010), p. S370.
15 Gordon (2010), p. S372.
16 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations’ (29 September 2011), https ://
healt h.mil/Refer ence-Cente r/Polic ies/2012/07/16/Joint -Pub-307-Stabi lity-Opera tions -Septe mber-29-
2011, p. xvi.
17 Curran and Holtom (2015), p. 4.
18 See e.g. UN Security Council, Resolution 2423 (28 June 2018), S/RES/2423, paras. 38(a)(i), 38(b); 
UN Security Council, Resolution 2364 (29 June 2017), S/RES/2364, para. 20(a)(i); UN Security Coun-
cil, Resolution 2387 (15 November 2017), S/RES/2387, para. 43(a); UN Security Council, Resolution 
2301 (26 July 2016), S/RES/2301, para. 34(a)(i).
19 S/RES/2423 (n. 18), para. 38(b); S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 20(a)(ii); S/RES/2387 (n. 18), para. 43(a)
(iv); S/RES/2301 (n. 18), para. 34(a)(v).
20 S/RES/2423 (n. 18), paras. 33, 34; S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 20(c)(ii); S/RES/2387 (n. 18), para. 
42(a)(ii); S/RES/2301 (n. 18), para. 34.
21 S/RES/2423 (n. 18), para. 38(a)(i); S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 20(a)(ii); S/RES/2387 (n. 18), para. 
43(e); S/RES/2301 (n. 18), para. 34(d).
22 De Coning (2018), p. 92.
23 Curran and Holtom (2015).
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left behind.24 As will be discussed below there are potential legal issues where UN 
forces engage in these activities.
3  Implications for Peacekeeping Doctrine and Future Mandates
3.1  The ‘Robust’ Use of Force: Offence or Defence?
As has just been mentioned the mandates of UN stabilization missions include the 
‘robust’ use of force. This section explains how ‘robust’ actions both toe a fine line 
between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and risk UN forces becoming a party 
to the conflict under IHL. The examples below demonstrate how it can be increas-
ingly difficult to determine where defence becomes offence. In recent years, man-
dates have typically authorised force in defence of the mandate under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. However, robustness strays toward taking the initiative in the 
use of force which is indicative of peace enforcement. While peace enforcement is 
permitted under Chapter VII and does not violate international law, the UN needs 
to clarify the course which peacekeeping operations are currently plotting as there 
can be consequences in international humanitarian law for both the troops and UN 
as a whole. Traditionally peacekeepers would ‘never take the initiative in the use of 
armed force’ and only respond in self-defence.25 In situations where UN forces are 
no longer acting in self-defence and are engaging an enemy to ‘silence sources of 
deadly fire’ the UN could be deemed a party to the conflict and bound by IHL.26
3.1.1  Mission Specific Examples of ‘Robustness’
In March 2013 MONUSCO was given a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which 
was the first UN blue helmet offensive combat force.27 The FIB was originally made 
up of 3069 soldiers mandated ‘to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutral-
ize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reduc-
ing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security’.28 The 
FIB would carry out its activities unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese army 
(FARDC) ‘in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner’.29 Therefore, the FIB 
would be partial and expressly take sides in the conflict between a state and armed 
groups affirming the state as the legitimate authority. The UN understood the FIB to 
24 Tull (2018), p. 186.
25 UN Secretary-General, ‘Summary of the experiences derived from the establishment and operation of 
the force’ (9 October 1958), A/3943, para. 179.
26 Sloan (2018), p. 276.
27 UN Security Council, Resolution 2098 (28 March 2013), para. 9; Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, 
‘Issue Brief: The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (International 
Peace Institute, July 2013), https ://relie fweb.int/sites /relie fweb.int/files /resou rces/The%20UN%20Int 
erven tion%20Bri gade%20in%20the %20Dem ocrat ic%20Rep ublic %20of%20the %20Con go.pdf, p. 2.
28 S/RES/2098 (n. 27), para. 12.
29 Ibid., para. 12.
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be a peace enforcement mission and not a peacekeeping one due to its use of not just 
robust force but going further into offensive action.30
Conversely, MINUSCA and MINUSMA are not defined as peace enforcement 
missions and have not used offensive force in a similar fashion to the FIB in the 
DRC but the mandates make use of similar wording; to extend state authority and 
stabilise population centres which is achieved through actions such as a ‘robust pos-
ture’ and active patrolling to deter armed groups and allow space for the restora-
tion of state authorities.31 Looking at MINUSCA first, in February 2017 the mis-
sion launched Operation Bekpa to stabilise the town of Bambari by securing the 
agreement that the armed groups would leave. MINUSCA used armed helicop-
ters to engage armed groups attempting to re-enter the town.32 Lieutenant General 
Keïta reported to the UN Security Council that the ‘operation succeeded because 
we bent various administrative rules, challenged some limiting agreements with 
troops and changed morale where the use of force was involved’.33 MINUSCA has 
further undertaken robust operations to ‘expel’ the Front démocratique group from 
roads between Baboua and Beloko.34 More recently, a ‘joint disarmament and arrest 
operation’ alongside the CAR armed forces (FACA) was launched against crimi-
nal groups in Bangui’s PK5 neighbourhood where MINUSCA participated in armed 
raids which led to exchanges of fire and the death of a peacekeeper.35 In the month 
following the armed raids, the UN Independent Expert on the situation of human 
rights in the Central African Republic, Marie-Thérèse Keita Bocoum, called for a 
strategy on the ‘neutralisation’ of armed groups in the CAR.36 Thus far, the ‘neutral-
isation’ of armed groups has not been included in MINUSCA’s mandate to denote 
similar offensive force to MONUSCO’s FIB.
Turning to MINUSMA, the mission has contingents of forces from Western 
countries and sophisticated military hardware including short range drones, and 
31 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic’ (2 June 
2017), S/2017/473, para. 2; S/RES/2301 (n. 18), paras. 34, 34(a); S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 19; UN 
Security Council, Resolution 2164 (25 June 2014), S/RES/2164, para. 13(a)(i).
32 S/2017/473 (n. 31), para. 11; UN Security Council, 7947th Meeting (23 May 2017), S/PV.7947, p. 12 
as per Mr. Barro.
33 S/PV.7947 (n. 32), p. 8 as per Lieutenant General Keïta.
34 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Repub-
lic’ (29 July 2015), S/2015/576, para. 23.
35 UN Security Council, ‘Situation in the Central African Republic’ (18 June 2018), S/2018/611, paras. 
16, 17; MINUSCA, ‘Central African Forces and MINUSCA launch a disarmament and arrest operation 
against armed criminals in Bangui’s PK5 neighborhood’ (Press Release, 8 April 2018), https ://minus 
ca.unmis sions .org/en/centr al-afric an-force s-and-minus ca-launc h-disar mamen t-and-arres t-opera tion-
again st-armed -crimi nals; MINUSCA, ‘MINUSCA condemns fresh attack against peacekeepers in Ban-
gui’ (Press Release, 10 April 2018), https ://minus ca.unmis sions .org/en/minus ca-conde mns-fresh -attac 
k-again st-peace keepe rs-bangu i.
36 MINUSCA, ‘UN expert calls for calm, protection of civilians in Central African Republic’ (3 May 
2018), https ://minus ca.unmis sions .org/en/un-exper t-calls -calm-prote ction -civil ians-centr al-afric an-repub 
lic.
30 See above, Cammaert and Blyth (n. 27).
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attack and transport helicopters.37 MINUSMA has aimed to ‘progressively dominate 
areas adjacent to population centres’ to prevent access to terrorist groups and crimi-
nals.38 In 2016 the UN Security Council called for MINUSMA to engage in direct 
operations against asymmetric threats.39 Tull believes this step by the UN Security 
Council is not ‘clear-cut’ peace enforcement but is midway between so-called robust 
peacekeeping and enforcement through offensive force.40 MINUSMA has carried 
out operations ‘to neutralize threats, targeting improvised explosive devices’, area 
and axis control of main supply routes to identify and arrest terrorists, and con-
ducted patrols with the support of attack helicopters.41
Considering in particular the joint disarmament and arrest operation in Bangui, is 
it clear where UN forces have used defensive rather than offensive force? The joint 
disarmament and arrest operation can, on the one hand be viewed as the UN taking 
the initiative in using force and taking an offensive footing to both deter future per-
petrators and neutralise the existing threat to civilians. On the other hand, it could 
be said that MINUSCA is operating in defence of the mandate since the mandate 
provides for MINUSCA to take urgent temporary measures allowing the mission ‘to 
arrest and detain in order to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity’.42 The 
question then becomes whether these urgent temporary measures allow the offen-
sive use of force when pursing basic law and order? The mandate specifically states 
the temporary measures are adopted ‘without prejudice to the agreed principles of 
peacekeeping operations’ which would indicate that force is to be used in defence 
of the mandate.43 The terminology though is troubling. Where UN forces leave 
their base with the intention of using force to exact armed raids and, in the event, 
exchange fire, it is difficult to maintain that the action is purely defensive.
Similarly, the call for MINUSMA to engage in ‘direct operations’ is not a 
clear authorisation to use offensive force but does, at least, raise the question as 
to whether it authorises the mission to take the initiative in using force to combat 
threats to civilians. As a result, there is a visible wavering between a ‘robust posture’ 
and enforcement activity. Despite the UN Security Council stating this posture is 
without prejudice to the principles of peacekeeping the underlying doctrine of peace 
operations comes into question where proactive steps are increasingly taken by UN 
forces.44
37 Karlsrud (2015), p. 47; Boutellis (2015), p. 8; for further examples of the intelligence equipment 
available to MINUSMA see de Cherisey (2017).
38 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (9 June 2014), 
S/2014/403, para. 66.
39 UN Security Council, Resolution 2295 (29 June 2016), S/RES/2295.
40 Tull (2018), p. 168.
41 S/RES/2295 (n. 39), para. 16; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation 
in Mali’ (29 September 2016), S/2016/819, paras. 32, 38.
42 S/RES/2387 (n. 18), para. 43(e)(iii).
43 Ibid., para. 43(e)(iii).
44 Ibid., para. 39.
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3.1.2  Is Robustness Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement?
UN peace operations have previously been said to operate under ‘Chapter VI and a 
half’. Traditional peacekeeping was conducted under Article 36(1) of the UN Char-
ter (Chapter VI) and UN forces would deploy with the consent of the host state and 
only use force in self-defence. Today’s operations, which go beyond the separation 
of warring parties and monitoring of  peace agreements, are  typically authorised 
under Chapter VII to use force and as a result are a blend of Articles 40 and 42 
depending on whether the UN forces are enforcing provisional measures or ‘tak-
ing all necessary measures’ to ensure the realisation of other mandated activities 
such as the protection of civilians. Alongside the Chapter VII mandate, UN forces 
will pursue traditional Chapter VI activities such as monitoring a peace agreement. 
Importantly though, modern UN peace operations that use force under Chapter VII 
do adhere, on some level, to the principles of consent, impartiality, and an altered 
interpretation of where they may use force, namely to protect themselves, persons 
they are mandated to protect, and the mission’s ability to achieve its mandate.45
Enforcement under Chapter VII has, in the past, been undertaken by coalitions 
of the willing whom operate under UN Security Council authorisation but do not 
constitute UN-mandated peace operations. The robust use of force by peacekeepers 
and the inception of the FIB has obscured the distinction between traditional peace-
keepers who use force in self-defence and those who can be more proactive under 
Chapter VII mandates, straying toward a more liberal use of force.
Most operations using robust force are not conducting ‘full-blown’ enforcement 
action under Chapter VII and do operate with the ‘consent, or at the least acqui-
escence, of all the parties to the conflict or dispute’.46 This is because robust force 
includes using force at the tactical level ‘to defend its mandate against spoilers 
whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process’ 
whereas peace enforcement allows the use of force at the strategic or international 
levels.47 By using force at the strategic and international levels, actions are taken in 
45 De Coning (2017), p. 147; UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines 
(UNDPKO 2008) (the ‘Capstone Doctrine’), http://www.un.org/en/peace keepi ng/docum ents/capst one_
eng.pdf, p. 34.
46 Gill and Fleck (2015), p. 154.
47 Capstone Doctrine (n. 45), p. 98, Bellamy and Hunt (2015), p. 1281; the Capstone Doctrine has been 
described as a move towards the robust use of force indicating a shift away from the traditional interpre-
tation of self-defence. See e.g. Gerchicoff (2013), p. 733. Mandates include strategic, operational and 
tactical goals and activities. The Security Council, Secretary-General and Secretariat occupy the strategic 
level giving legal authority and high-level direction and guidance. The operational level is the field-based 
management of a peace operation by Mission Headquarters comprising, the Head of Mission, Head of 
Military and Police components (HOMC and HOPC), Deputy Special Representative(s) of the Secretary-
General (DSRSG), and Director of Mission Support/Chief of Mission Support (DMS/CMS). The tactical 
level is the management of military, police, and civilian operations below Mission Headquarters where 
supervision is given by subordinate commanders. See UNDPKO, ‘Authority, Command and Control in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’ (Ref. 2008.4, February 2008).
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excess of self-defence and both the use and threat of force are deemed to be ‘accept-
able methods of persuasion—not measures of last resort’.48
For instance, the FIB operates under an enforcement mandate where force is used 
at the strategic level alongside the host state military.49 The FIB does not only use 
force in self-defence. Instead there is an assumption that the FIB will use force pro-
actively to neutralise targets. Due to the relationship with the host state, the FIB 
consequently acts in a partial matter where it has taken a side in the conflict and 
identified an aggressor, which it uses offensive force to combat.50
By using the interpretation that robust force means using force in defence of the 
mandate those operations are not perceived to have veered into peace enforcement 
as a whole and instead remain peacekeeping operations. However, there is debate on 
whether certain robust actions taken under mandates that utilise ‘robust’ force con-
stitute enforcement action under Article 42.51 Actions such as the arrest operation 
in the PK5 neighbourhood are likely carried out under the authorisation to use force 
in the defence of the mandate and to protect civilians.52 However, it has previously 
been argued that ‘allowing peacekeepers to use force in defence of the mandate sim-
ply introduces the use of offensive force through the back door’.53 The question then 
becomes, at what point does defence become offence? Using force in defence of the 
mandate is a catch all phrase which allows a peace operation to take the initiative. 
Taking the initiative risks becoming synonymous with offensive force if operations 
regularly take direct actions against asymmetric threats, perform disarmament and 
arrest operations or other actions where peacekeepers seek out threats to the peace 
process.
3.1.3  Can Robust Force Make the UN a Party to the Conflict under IHL?
The default status of a peacekeeper is as a non-combatant, but the status can be 
subject to change with the peacekeeper classified as a combatant if they actively 
engage in the armed conflict and the intensity threshold is met.54 The robust use 
of force has sparked a debate as to when and who become parties to the conflict 
when fighting intensifies between UN troops and armed groups. The UN Office of 
48 Patryk I. Labuda, ‘Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement’ (Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public Inter-
national Law, September 2015), para. 34.
49 Cammaert and Blyth (n. 27), p. 6; See also, Tull (2018), p. 185.
50 De Coning (2017), p. 148. See also, Berdal (2018).
51 See e.g. Tardy (2011).
52 It is interesting to note that the PK5 operation is one of law enforcement targeting criminal gangs. 
Under the mandate at the time, Resolution 2387, MINUSCA’s urgent temporary measures to arrest and 
detain persons to maintain basic law and order are explicitly to be used ‘where national security forces 
are not present or operational’. The operation was carried out alongside CAR forces which must mean 
MINUSCA believed it could instead act under its protection of civilians mandate. See S/RES/2387 (n. 
18), para. 42(e)(iii).
53 Pacholska (2015), p. 51.
54 White (2015), p. 52; UN Secretary General, ‘UN Secretary General’s Bulletin, Observance by UN 
Forces of International Humanitarian Law’ (6 August 1999), UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13; Gill et  al. 
(2017), p. 95; Foley (2017), p. 140.
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Legal Affairs previously stated with regards to the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) that UN forces are not under an obligation to uphold the Geneva 
Conventions since the treaty obligations of humanitarian law are only applicable to 
states.55 Domestic courts took similar views, such as in Canada where it was said 
humanitarian law does not apply to peace operations and in Belgium where it was 
found humanitarian law did not apply to Belgian troops in Somalia and Rwanda.56 
The UN has also claimed it cannot be a ‘party’ to or a ‘High Contracting Power’ in 
an armed conflict under the Geneva Conventions.57 Although in 1999 the Secretary 
General issued a bulletin outlining that UN forces would observe IHL where they 
are actively engaged as combatants.58
In 2015, the HIPPO Report stressed that when UN operations stray into enforce-
ment actions, they must be carried out with full respect for humanitarian law and 
that such actions ‘may make the United Nations forces, and the mission as a whole, 
a party to the conflict…’59 Invariably this raises two points. First, the HIPPO Report 
has raised the possibility that, in fact, the UN could be a party to the conflict despite 
not being a ‘High Contracting Power’ and not having the juridical and administra-
tive frameworks in place to meet the obligations found in the Geneva Conventions.60 
Second, the HIPPO Report did not address the issue of when the robust use of force 
could result in the mission becoming a party to the conflict.
Whether the UN is a party to the conflict is particularly relevant where peace-
keepers are undertaking operations alongside host state forces. In such a situation 
it may be the case that the host state forces are a party to the conflict, but the UN 
mission is not. MINUSMA and MINUSCA are both deployed to theatres of opera-
tion where a non-international armed conflict exists (NIAC). For the existence of a 
NIAC there needs to be armed violence of sufficient intensity and the parties need to 
be sufficiently organised.61 In determining whether a peace operation has become a 
party to a NIAC there needs to be consideration of the mandate, the rules of engage-
ment, the nature of the equipment used, the nature of and frequency of force used 
between the parties, and the conduct of personnel.62
For example, in MONUSCO the FIB operations to neutralise armed groups were 
carried out using heavy weapons and  in concert with  FARDC. The question was 
55 Murphy (2007), p. 247.
56 Ibid., pp. 273–276; Her Majesty the Queen v. Private DJ Brocklebank, [1996] Court Martial Appeal 
Court of Canada, Court File No. CMAC-383; Judgment of the Belgian Military Court regarding viola-
tions of IHL committed in Somalia and Rwanda (20 November 1997), Nr 54 AR 1997.
57 Murphy (2007), p. 215.
58 ST/SGB/1999/13 (n. 54).
59 HIPPO Report (n. 5), para. 122.
60 Murphy (2007), p. 248; the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have stressed that 
where UN peace operations take persons into detention they must be able to meet their legal obligations 
and that ‘detention related activities of missions remain underfunded with limited capacities in terms of 
logistics, infrastructure and trained human resources’. ICRC, ‘Peacekeeping operations: ICRC statement 
to the United Nations, 2017’ (27 October 2017), https ://www.icrc.org/en/docum ent/peace keepi ng-opera 
tions -icrc-state ment-unite d-natio ns-2017.
61 Gill et al. (2017), p. 94.
62 Ibid., p. 95.
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whether the entire operation had become a party to a NIAC or not? Some members 
of the UN Security Council argued that there was a distinction to be drawn where 
the FIB could be regarded as a party to the conflict but that the rest of MONUSCO 
was not.63 The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Per-
sonnel, which outlines the protections afforded to UN peacekeepers, specifies that 
the provisions do not apply to an operation authorised as an enforcement action.64 
As has been discussed above, stabilization missions are not expressly mandated 
as enforcement actions but have stronger mandates to engage armed groups. This 
leaves a grey area of when those peacekeepers become a party to the conflict if hos-
tilities intensify.
Looking at Mali in particular, if it is accepted that there is a NIAC between the 
state and various terrorist groups operating in the north of the country it becomes 
important to consider whether MINUSMA is a party to that NIAC. As discussed 
above, MINUSMA has been mandated to engage in ‘direct operations’ and it has 
been supported by sophisticated military hardware such as short-range drones and 
attack helicopters.65 In addition, the most recent mandate renewal in 2018 speci-
fies that MINUSMA is to conduct joint operations and share information with the 
Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF).66 Peace operations do not typically 
fight a war against an enemy and will usually use force sporadically.67 Instead peace 
operations often provide logistical support and intelligence for the host state. Where 
providing support the ICRC argues UN forces can be deemed a party to a pre-exist-
ing NIAC under the following circumstances;
(1) there is a pre-existing NIAC taking place on the territory in which mul-
tinational forces are called on to intervene; (2) actions related to the conduct 
of hostilities are undertaken by multinational forces in the context of the pre-
existing conflict; (3) the military operations of multinational forces are car-
ried out in support (as described above) of a party to the pre-existing conflict; 
and (4) the action in question is undertaken pursuant to an official decision by 
the troop-contributing country or the relevant organization to support a party 
involved in the pre-existing conflict.68
The ICRC claims that meeting these criteria displays a ‘genuine belligerent 
intent’ which would result in participation in hostilities.69 Nevertheless, the UN 
Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Stephen Mathias, has said that even 
where there are not direct armed clashes with spoilers it is unclear whether sup-
port for the host state alone would make the UN mission a party to the conflict.70 
63 Mathias (2017), p. 143.
64 The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, Art. 2(2).
65 De Cherisey (2017).
66 S/RES/2423 (n. 18), para. 38(b).
67 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’ (32nd 
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 8–10 December 2015), p. 22.
68 Ibid., p. 23.
69 Ibid., p. 23.
70 Mathias (2017), p. 143. NB comments were made in a personal capacity.
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Stabilization missions are seemingly combining both (1) support for the host state 
military capacities with (2) a more robust posture that could result in an intensifica-
tion of hostilities. Even if the UN do not accept that providing logistical support 
and intelligence makes the mission a party to the conflict, the fact that MINUSMA 
is conducting joint operations, is supported by attack helicopters and drones, and 
have had skirmishes with armed groups, make the intensification of hostilities a dis-
tinct possibility. Where there are sustained, direct clashes between MINUSMA and 
armed groups it would be difficult for the UN to contest the applicability of IHL. 
In this situation then a mandate to use robust force can lay the groundwork for UN 
forces to more frequently engage in clashes and also carve a larger role for the UN in 
the provision of military support to a host state.
It is important to note that the consequence of becoming a party to the conflict, or 
participation in hostilities, is that UN peacekeepers would lose their non-combatant 
status and could legally be targeted by armed groups. Whereas, where the UN mis-
sion is not a party or not participating in hostilities, the targeting of peacekeepers is 
prohibited.71 Whether the entire mission becomes a party to the conflict or whether 
peacekeepers would lose their protection as non-combatants individually has been 
debated elsewhere.72 Regardless of this issue, the UN Security Council needs to be 
aware of the consequences of undertaking direct operations which open UN forces 
to lawful attack and risk embroiling the UN in a protracted conflict that could further 
harm civilians.73 If the ‘robust turn’ in peacekeeping is here to stay the UN will need 
to be proactive in clarifying the legal position of its peacekeepers when hostilities 
intensify and when UN forces are called upon to engage armed groups. Especially 
given the trend of stabilization missions cooperating closely with the host state there 
needs to be clear legal guidance from the UN Office of Legal Affairs on what types 
and levels of support can amount to UN participation in an armed conflict.
3.2  Counter‑Terrorism
In September 2014 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 which 
condemned violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, and called 
on states to do more to counter this threat.74 As part of the UN’s response, the 
71 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 33, https ://ihl-datab ases.icrc.org/custo mary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_
rul_rule3 3; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8(b)(iii).
72 Mathias (2017); ICRC (n. 67), p. 25.
73 Similar conclusions are reached by a recent Saferworld report where the UN uses more proactive 
force. Larry Attree, Jordan Street and Luca Venchiarutti, ‘United Nations peace operations in complex 
environments: Charting the right course’ (Saferworld, September 2018), https ://www.safer world .org.uk/
resou rces/publi catio ns/1183-unite d-natio ns-peace -opera tions -in-compl ex-envir onmen ts-chart ing-the-
right -cours e, p. 29; Mona Ali Kahlil, ‘The world needs robust peacekeeping not aggressive peacekeep-
ing’ (ICRC, 15 May 2018), https ://blogs .icrc.org/law-and-polic y/2018/05/15/world -needs -robus t-peace 
keepi ng-not-aggre ssive -peace keepi ng/.
74 UN Security Council, Resolution 2178 (24 September 2014), S/RES/2178.
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Secretary-General presented a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism to the 
General Assembly in January 2016.75 Karlsrud argues the Plan of Action forms part 
of a broad counter-terrorism agenda at the UN and gives it global legitimacy.76 As 
a result, the UN is pressured to conduct counter-terrorism activities but thus far has 
largely resisted.77 The HIPPO Report clearly states that UN missions should not 
conduct counter-terrorism operations and where the UN operates alongside paral-
lel counter-terror forces the roles of each presence must be clearly demarcated.78 
Though in 2017 the UN General Assembly established a UN Office of Counter-Ter-
rorism to provide leadership on counter-terrorism mandates entrusted to the Secre-
tary-General, strengthen UN counter-terrorism assistance, and improve the visibility 
of UN counter-terrorism efforts.79 As will be discussed below, the expansion and 
enhanced visibility of UN counter-terrorism activities pose a serious risk to a peace 
operation’s other priority tasks.
The rhetoric of terrorism is no more present than in MINUSMA. The UN forces 
operate alongside French troops deployed as part of Operation Barkhane (previously 
Operation Serval) and a regional counter-terrorism force, the G-5 Sahel Force (FC-
G5S).80 Both the French and FC-G5S are said to support MINUSMA and the UN 
Security Council welcomed ‘the continued action by the French forces […] to deter 
the terrorist threat in the North of Mali’.81 Furthermore, the UN Security Council 
stated the FC-G5S will ‘facilitate the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate to sta-
bilize Mali’.82 In February 2018 a technical agreement was signed for MINUSMA 
to provide operational and logistical support to FC-G5S.83 During 2018 uniformed 
MINUSMA personnel assisted FC-G5S with preparing their operational bases and 
the Secretary-General called for coordination between the forces to be boosted 
further.84
MINUSMA has also supported the host state in its fight against terrorism. Mali 
has called for the UN Security Council to help Government forces in countering ter-
rorism by deploying a Force Intervention Brigade, similar to that in MONUSCO, 
75 UN General Assembly, ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’ (24 December 2015), 
A/70/674.
76 Karlsrud (2019), p. 4.
77 See e.g. UN Security Council, 7355th Meeting (6 January 2015), S/PV.7355, p. 5 as per Mr. Diop; 
Charbonneau (2017), p. 421.
78 HIPPO Report (n. 5), p. 34; see also, Gray (2016).
79 UN General Assembly, ‘Strengthening the capability of the United Nations system to assist Mem-
ber States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ (15 June 2017), A/
RES/71/291.
80 The UN Security Council welcomed FC-G5S in Resolution 2359 and provided for its formal coopera-
tion with MINUSMA in Resolution 2391; for more information on the French intervention in Mali see 
Bannelier and Christakis (2018). UN Security Council, Resolution 2359 (21 June 2017), S/RES/2359; 
UN Security Council, Resolution 2391 (8 December 2017), S/RES/2391.
81 UN Security Council, Resolution 2227 (19 June 2015), S/RES/2227, p. 3.
82 S/RES/2391 (n. 80), para. 12.
83 UN Security Council, ‘Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel’ (12 November 2018), 
S/2018/1006, para. 44.
84 UN Security Council, ‘Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel’ (8 May 2018), S/2018/432, 
paras. 3, 68.
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to offensively combat terrorist groups.85 The UN Security Council has thus far 
refused to authorise such a force but MINUSMA has assisted the host state in put-
ting its specialized unit on terrorism and transnational organized crime into action 
and helped with the drafting of a national counter-terrorism strategy.86 Charbonneau 
reports that a Malian official stated the ‘UN should do its job and break these ter-
rorists’.87 One issue the UN faces when cooperating on terrorism is that the Malian 
authorities refer to the entire conflict, since 2012, as terrorism and does not distin-
guish between Tuareg rebel armed groups seeking self-determination and Islamic 
terrorists operating in the country.88
The UN Security Council is far from in agreement over the extent to which the 
UN should be involved with offensive counter-terrorism operations. Resolution 2359 
does not authorise FC-G5S under Chapter VII, instead the regional force operates 
with the consent of the states involved, due to US reluctance.89 Neither has the UN 
Security Council previously used Chapter VII to authorise force against terrorists 
and instead states typically use force in self-defence.90 MINUSMA is an interesting 
situation though. MINUSMA is mandated to use robust force under Chapter VII and 
to provide logistical and operational support to FC-G5S and share intelligence.91 
MINUSMA’s Chapter VII mandate is consequently linked to supporting a regional 
counter-terrorism operation which uses offensive force with the open encourage-
ment of the UN Security Council. By using UN resources to support the FC-G5S 
the UN Security Council is taking further steps to combat terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security.
3.2.1  Intelligence Sharing
MINUSMA supports counter-terrorism through the identification of groups and 
individuals considered a threat to the mission and includes them in ‘targeting 
packs’.92 MINUSMA has a sophisticated intelligence system making use of a Ger-
man unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) unit and a Swedish reconnaissance company of 
armoured vehicles, amongst others.93 The targeting packs are compiled by the All 
Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU) which is tasked with collecting action-
able intelligence and has included personnel from the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
85 S/PV.7355 (n. 77), p. 5 as per Mr. Diop; UN Security Council, 7600th Meeting (11 January 2016), S/
PV.7600, p. 8 as per Mr. Diop.
86 S/2016/819 (n. 41), para. 33.
87 Charbonneau (2017), p. 421.
88 UN Security Council, 7719th Meeting (16 June 2016), S/PV.7719, p. 4 as per Mr. Keita; Charbonneau 
(2017), p. 421.
89 Jennifer G Cooke, ‘Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Secu-
rity?’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 November 2017), https ://www.csis.org/analy sis/
under stand ing-g5-sahel -joint -force -fight ing-terro r-build ing-regio nal-secur ity.
90 White (2012), pp. 73, 74; Henderson (2013) p. 157.
91 S/RES/2423 (n. 18), paras. 48, 50.
92 Karlsrud (2019), p. 13.
93 De Cherisey (2017) pp. 2, 3.
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Norway.94 The informal sharing of the targeting packs with Operation Barkhane was 
reported to the UN as possibly having ‘serious operational, political and legal impli-
cations’.95 The legal implication being, MINUSMA becomes a party to the conflict 
under IHL as a result of providing ‘actionable intelligence’ for the French Operation 
Barkhane.96 The HIPPO Report’s determination that a UN peace operation should 
maintain clear and distinct divisions of labour between itself and parallel offensive 
operations has not been heeded in Mali. Where MINUSMA is concerned the divi-
sions are blurred with ASIFU involving itself with the work of non-UN forces fight-
ing terrorism.
Intelligence sharing between MINUSMA and FC-G5S could have a range of 
consequences both in law and for the individuals involved on the ground. States 
need effective legal systems to be able to address any human rights violations and 
to ensure the rule of law during counter-terror operations.97 Intelligence sharing in 
particular can affect a range of rights, such as the right to a private and family life or 
freedom of speech. The UN though does not have a legal system or frameworks in 
place to provide remedies for potential violations. The quagmire of holding the UN 
accountable has been extensively researched showing how difficult it is for individu-
als to hold international organisations accountable for their decisions when harm is 
caused.98 For the UN to continue its public engagement in intelligence sharing, at 
a minimum, a complaints system offering remedies and reparations will need to be 
available for affected individuals.
For example, human intelligence (HUMINT) is conducted through the coop-
eration of individuals to provide information. If MINUSMA is collecting intelli-
gence from individuals, then it needs to be made overtly clear to individuals that 
the information will be shared with both MDSF and international forces. Collect-
ing HUMINT requires trust from the individuals in the collecting body.99 Similarly, 
any signals intelligence, where data on individuals is mined, should have clear rules, 
be subject to independent oversight, and should be made explicit to individuals 
affected.100 To safeguard work on local peace initiatives the UN needs to make cer-
tain that possible negative outcomes and perceptions of intelligence sharing do not 
damage trust with local people. Individuals may feel aggrieved if information shared 
with the UN leads to human rights abuses committed by, for instance, MDSF forces 
during counter-terror operations.
The UN does have a Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) which receives alle-
gations of misconduct, can make recommendations, and ultimately forward 
94 Kjeksrud and Vermeij (2017), p. 232.
95 Karlsrud (2019), p. 13; The author cites UN, ‘Lessons Learned Report’ (Sources Information Fusion 
Unit and the MINUSMA Intelligence Architecture, Semi-final draft for USG Ladsous’ review, 1 March 
2016), p. 3. On file with John Karlsrud.
96 Karlsrud (2017b), p. 1224.
97 Staberock (2012), p. 357.
98 Freedman (2018), p. 962.
99 Staberock (2012), p. 361.
100 Ibid., p. 365.
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investigations to the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).101 The CDU has 
internal teams, Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs), within peace operations. 
MINUSMA’s CDT emphasises its zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and 
abuse.102 All UN staff must respect fundamental rights under the Staff Rules and 
Regulations, but this is far from a clear and incontrovertible framework for hold-
ing personnel responsible for violations arising from intelligence related activi-
ties.103 The issue of whether the UN would be able to exercise effective disciplinary 
authority for violations of rights in the course of intelligence gathering is further 
complicated by whether personnel are military or civilian, and if, in the absence of 
UN disciplinary authority, troop contributing countries (TCCs) would have the legal 
frameworks in place to address violations committed abroad while operating as part 
of the UN missions.
3.2.2  Consequences of Engagement with Counter‑Terror Operations
The UN rightfully states the fight against terrorism must not infringe upon human 
rights or marginalise communities.104 The UN itself has recognised that Malian 
counter-terror operations have violated human rights law ‘which compounded the 
communities’ feeling of marginalization from the peace process’.105 In addition, the 
UN has already begun investigations into serious human rights violations commit-
ted by FC-G5S forces, including the killing of civilians.106 It is true that counter-
terror operations could create a more secure and stable environment by reducing 
the threat of terrorism. However, if, in the eyes of Malian communities, the UN is 
part of counter-terrorism efforts alongside the government and international forces 
which have committed numerous human rights violations the mission’s efforts to 
bring together the affected parties and reconcile the conflict would be undermined. 
The UN’s position as an impartial arbitrator would naturally be weakened.
As early as 2003, Bredel warned ‘the UN should be cautious about allowing 
counter-terrorism to encroach unduly on the notion of long-term conflict preven-
tion’.107 Today MINUSMA risks damaging the creation of a lasting peace in Mali. 
For instance, Charbonneau highlights that Operation Barkhane and FC-G5S exter-
nalise the fight against terrorism by operating on a regional level and in turn under-
mine the Malian peace process.108 The mandates of the UN Security Council could 
cause further marginalisation in the north of Mali where they expressly support a 
counter-terrorism agenda and result in MINUSMA forces operating alongside FC-
G5S forces which have committed human rights violations. This would negatively 
101 UN General Assembly, ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations 
in All Their Aspects’ (24 March 2005), A/59/710, para. 42; see e.g. Freedman (2018), p. 971.
102 MINUSMA, ‘Conduct and Discipline’, https ://minus ma.unmis sions .org/en/condu ct-and-disci pline .
103 UN, ‘Staff Rules Handbook’, https ://hr.un.org/handb ook/staff -rules , Regulation 1.2.
104 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (31 May 2016), 
S/2016/498, para. 84.
105 Ibid., para. 39.
106 S/2018/1006 (n. 83), para. 31.
107 Bredel (2003), p. 65.
108 Charbonneau (2017), pp. 424, 425.
64 A. Gilder 
123
influence the peace process and further marginalisation would present a continued 
threat to international peace and security.
The UN’s counter-terrorism agenda must be distinct from its other work if it 
wishes to avoid the risk of undermining other activities in pursuit of stabilization, 
such as inclusive peace and national reconciliation. Gowan believes the UN must be 
prepared to conduct robust operations to counter terrorism and if it does not it risks 
irrelevance.109 However, missions cannot work alongside offensive international 
forces if they realistically wish to assist with reconciling the differences of com-
munities and groups which form the root causes of the conflict. A decision where 
the mission has gathered intelligence and designated certain persons as terrorists 
for targeting purposes could easily mar other mandated activities such as support-
ing local peace committees, for instance. The UN Security Council needs to utilise 
its mandating function to clarify in more detail a mission’s role when it seeks to 
engage with counter-terrorism activities. A more transparent and clear approach to 
counter-terrorism is needed to demarcate what kinds of support UN forces are able 
to provide and importantly where the UN draws the line.
3.3  Increased Cooperation with the Host State
Cooperation with host state forces in stabilization missions presents a serious risk of 
partiality in the conflict. Following the Capstone Doctrine, it is understood that UN 
forces must be impartial in dealing with parties to the conflict but not neutral in the 
execution of the mandate and can take coercive action against spoilers, those who 
attempt to undermine the peace process.110 The position of the UN as an impartial 
actor becomes tenuous when the mandates of MINUSCA and MINUSMA expressly 
call for the missions to assist with the extension of state authority, assist with the 
redeployment of host state forces, and to conduct joint operations and share infor-
mation.111 Kjeksrud and Vermeij argue MINUSMA has de facto partiality which 
has led to its forces being targeted for retaliation by armed and terrorist groups.112 
By working alongside the host state the UN takes sides in a civil war and fails to 
act with any sense of impartiality. Where, in the eyes of individuals and communi-
ties, the UN cooperates with a state which has previously committed human rights 
violations the UN could lose the trust of sections of the population. For example, the 
UN has a visible commitment to ending conflict-based sexual violence and bringing 
perpetrators to justice, but that work could be threatened where the UN is seen to be 
synonymous with the perpetrators. Likewise, where communities are sympathetic to 
109 Richard Gowan, ‘The Downside of Keeping the U.N. Out of Counterterrorist Missions’ (World Poli-
tics Review, 10 September 2018), https ://www.world polit icsre view.com/artic les/25829 /the-downs ide-of-
keepi ng-the-u-n-out-of-count erter roris t-missi ons.
110 Capstone Doctrine (n. 45), p. 33; White (2015), p. 50.
111 See e.g. S/RES/2387 (n. 18), para. 42(a)(iv); S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 20(a)(i); UN Security Coun-
cil, Resolution 2409 (27 March 2018), S/RES/2409, para. 34; S/RES/2423 (n. 18), para. 38(b).
112 Kjeksrud and Vermeij (2017), p. 234.
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the opposing side of the civil war the UN forces risk becoming the enemy alongside 
the host state potentially exacerbating the conflict.
Looking at the CAR specifically, a large number of FACA soldiers deserted 
following the 2012 coup and the Transitional Authorities sought assistance with 
rebuilding its military capabilities. The EU deployed a training mission (EUTM 
RCA) in 2016 to assist with defence sector reform.113 The EU has trained almost 
3000 FACA soldiers who are now being redeployed to work alongside international 
forces.114 The UN stresses the members of FACA need ‘clean criminal and human 
rights records’.115 However, given the history of abuses by FACA it is paramount 
that communities trust the forces will not commit further human rights violations.116 
MINUSCA has carried out joint patrols with FACA and supported their redeploy-
ment to Obo and Paoua on an ad hoc and temporary basis.117 In the interim, while 
FACA regains the trust of the CAR people, the UN forces risk damaging their rela-
tionship with communities as the UN begins to cooperate more frequently with 
FACA forces.
One way to mitigate the risk of marginalisation is to explain the role of the UN’s 
Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) to communities. The HRDDP 
requires that UN assistance can only be given to non-UN security forces upon their 
respect for human rights, humanitarian law, and refugee law.118 The policy is par-
ticularly relevant for stabilization operations due to the level of support given to the 
host state and UN cooperation with host state forces. The UN cannot provide sup-
port to or cooperate with forces where there are substantial grounds to believe viola-
tions could occur and corrective or mitigating measures have not been taken by the 
authorities in question.119 The HRDDP has been argued to go further than existing 
legal obligations by using a preventative mechanism to avoid situations where there 
is merely a risk of violations.120
113 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1791 on the signing and conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the 
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Central African 
Republic on the status of the European Union CSDP Military Training Mission in the Central African 
Republic (EUTM RCA) [2016] OJ L274/31.
114 EUTM, ‘European Union Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA)’ (13 August 
2018), https ://eeas.europ a.eu/sites /eeas/files /18082 3_missi on_facts heet_eutm_rca_jul18 _v1.pdf.
115 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 15 May 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council’ (16 May 2018), S/2018/463, para. 22.
116 This issue is recognised by the UN here, S/2018/463 (n. 115), paras. 4, 25.
117 UN Security Council, 7787th Meeting (10 October 2016), S/PV.7787, p. 2 as per Mr. Ladsous; 
S/2018/463 (n. 115), para. 5.
118 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (28 November 
2012), S/2012/894, para. 22.
119 UN General Assembly and Security Council, ‘Identical letters dated 25 February 2013 from the Sec-
retary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security 
Council’ (5 March 2013), UN Doc. A/67/775–S/2013/110, para. 1.
120 Aust (2015), p. 71.
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3.3.1  Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts
Support for the redeployment of MDSF and FACA could have legal consequences 
for the UN where host state forces commit serious breaches of human rights or 
humanitarian law. Most literature on the responsibility of peacekeepers for wrongful 
acts focuses on the apportioning of responsibility between the UN and TCCs.121 UN 
forces are regularly deemed subsidiary organs and under Article 6 of the Draft Arti-
cles on Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO) the UN is responsi-
ble for their wrongful conduct. Article 7 of DARIO also allows for responsibility to 
be allocated to whomever has effective control over the organ, which may be the UN 
or the TCC depending on who, at the time of the wrongful act, has command and 
control of the forces.122 However, the UN has stated it assumes responsibility under 
Article 6 for acts of UN forces as organs of the organisation regardless of whether 
there is effective control making Article 7 ‘almost entirely redundant’.123 Arguments 
have been made though that forces contributed by TCCs are not fully under the com-
mand and control of the UN and Article 7 and its effective control test is relevant.124 
With increased cooperation between the UN and the host state, apportioning respon-
sibility between the UN and host state forces may become increasingly relevant.
Would it then be possible to hold the UN responsible for actions committed by 
host state forces where the UN and host state have cooperated closely? First, look-
ing at Article 7, the host state troops would need to be regarded as organs or agents 
of the UN. The UN has a tight definition of who is to be regarded as an agent of 
the organisation and has criticised the International Law Commission’s broad use 
of the term ‘agent’ in DARIO.125 Even in a situation where host state forces are 
mandated to cooperate and carry out functions alongside UN forces the UN would 
still not automatically regard them as agents for attribution. There would need to be 
a degree of control of the host state forces by the UN mission’s chain of command to 
be regarded as more than merely partners achieving a common goal. As a result, the 
actions of host state forces will only be attributable to the organisation under Article 
7 if there is a ‘sufficiently close relationship’ or the UN has effective control over the 
forces.126
Another route to find responsibility is Article 14 of DARIO. An international 
organisation can be held responsible where it ‘aids or assists’ a state in the com-
mission of an internationally wrongful act if: (a) the organisation does so with 
121 See e.g. Ryngaert (2012), Palchetti (2013) and Buchan (2012).
122 Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries (2011), Art. 7.
123 UN General Assembly, ‘Responsibility of international organizations: comments and observations 
received from international organizations’ (17 February 2011), A/CN.4/637/Add.1, pp. 13, 14; Ryngaert 
(2012), p. 159.
124 Ryngaert (2012), p. 162; Buchan (2012) argues that neither the effective control or ‘ultimate author-
ity and control’ tests are suitable.
125 Ryngaert (2012), p. 162.
126 Ibid., pp. 162, 163.
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knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the 
act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organisation.127 For 
UN responsibility its forces would need to make a ‘significant’ contribution to the 
wrongful act.128 An example of the risk arose in the UN Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) where the mission needed to decide whether to 
adhere to its mandate requiring it to provide support to host state forces who were 
likely to commit serious violations or refuse to do so.129 The UN Office of Legal 
Affairs decided that where there is reason to believe host states are engaged in seri-
ous violations then the UN forces cannot lawfully continue to provide support.130 
Similarly, in 2014 the UN Security Council terminated assistance to the South Suda-
nese government provided by the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) after civil 
war broke out.131 Mathias says it is unclear how much support the UN would need to 
provide to be responsible for a wrongful act.132
This question is important today with the mandates of MINUSMA and 
MINUSCA expressly calling for support and cooperation between UN and host state 
forces. The situation with MONUC occurred before the inception of the HRDDP. 
The UN makes it clear any support given to a state is on the basis that the state 
respects human rights and humanitarian law. Stabilization practice in general though 
is geared toward the UN providing direct support to the state for extending the lat-
ter’s authority. Despite the UN’s insistence on adhering to the HRDDP it is true that 
both MINUSMA and MSDF forces have committed human rights abuses in recent 
years. If this becomes more prevalent, particularly alongside counter-terror opera-
tions, then the UN Office for Legal Affairs will need to evaluate whether UN stabili-
zation missions can continue to provide support to their host states.
To mitigate any risk to other priorities in the mandate the UN Security Council 
could use the mandate to more clearly demarcate how and where assistance will be 
given and communicate this to the population. The use of radio to disseminate infor-
mation and improve communication is included in MINUSMA’s mandate but only 
since 2017, over 4 years since the mission’s initial authorisation.133 The UN Security 
Council must be more conscious of considering how best to disseminate mandates 
and their purpose to local populations and create a manageable set of expectations.
A commitment to the HRDDP is important from the start of a stabilization mis-
sion that will be cooperating closely with the host state. Karlsrud says the empha-
sis on the HRDDP shows there are ‘lingering concerns’ about close cooperation 
with other actors.134 The UN could conversely distance itself from the host state, 
not take sides in a civil war, and use the mandates to publicly spell out the distinc-
tion between UN and host state forces. This could help harmonise the two sides of 
127 DARIO (n. 122), Art. 14.
128 Ibid., p. 66.
129 Mathias (2017), p. 147.
130 UN General Assembly, ‘Report of the International Law Commission’ (26 April–3 June and 4 July–
12 August 2011), A/66/10, p. 105.
131 UN Security Council, Resolution 2155 (27 May 2014), S/RES/2155.
132 Mathias (2017), p. 147.
133 S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 24.
134 Karlsrud (2019), p. 9.
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current stabilization practice and make sure that building the capacity and work-
ing with the host state does not compromise a mandate’s other tasks. However, the 
organisation still needs to adopt a definition of stabilization to give a consistent 
foundation for mandates.
3.4  Human Rights and the Rule of Law
An area of stabilization practice perhaps not given enough attention by existing lit-
erature is the focus on ensuring the rule of law and ending impunity. Re-establishing 
the rule of law forms part of the second step of stabilization, peacebuilding in the 
power vacuum left behind after displacing armed groups. Peace operations achieve 
this by supporting the host state in rebuilding the criminal justice system through 
training judges, refurbishing courts and prisons, and in the case of MINUSCA, 
assisting with the creation of a Special Criminal Court under unique powers found 
in the mandate.
When MINUSCA was first mandated, the UN Security Council stressed the 
need to end impunity for violations of international law either within the national 
legal system or before the International Criminal Court.135 To assist the transitional 
authorities in that endeavour, MINUSCA was to monitor and report on violations 
of IHL and human rights and to work on preventing future violations by utilising 
human rights observers.136 Though ending impunity would be particularly difficult 
where the Central African authorities lacked sufficient control of government func-
tions. MINUSCA was mandated to extend state authority, to build the capacity of 
the judicial system and reinstate the criminal justice system ‘within the framework 
of the United Nations global focal point on rule of law’.137 This formed part of an 
overarching strategy for MINUSCA where it was believed (a) international forces 
would be more effective if the penal system was re-established and (b) there must be 
development and respect of human rights and the rule of law if the CAR is to have 
peace.138 To further rectify the ‘dysfunctional’ legal system in the CAR, MINUSCA 
adopted urgent temporary measures ‘to maintain basic law and order and fight impu-
nity’ authorised under its mandate.139
Establishing law and order to support international justice and protect civilians is 
a unique aspect of MINUSCA’s mandate. Under the mission’s initial mandate, the 
UN Security Council decided,
135 UN Security Council, Resolution 2149 (10 April 2014), S/RES/2149, p. 2, para. 12.
136 Ibid., para. 30(e)(i).
137 Ibid., paras. 30(f)(ii), 30(f)(iii).
138 UN Security Council, 7206th Meeting (24 June 2014), S/PV.7206, p. 3 as per Mr. Gaye; UN Security 
Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to para-
graph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)’ (3 March 2014), S/2014/142, para. 10.
139 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 19 December 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’ (22 December 2014), S/2014/928, para. 56; S/RES/2149 (n. 135), 
para. 40; S/RES/2301 (n. 18), para. 34(d)(i).
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…that MINUSCA may, within the limits of its capacities and areas of deploy-
ment, at the formal request of the Transitional Authorities and in areas where 
national security forces are not present or operational, adopt urgent temporary 
measures on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent and with-
out prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping operations, which are 
limited in scope, time bound and consistent with the objectives set forth in 
paragraphs 30 (a) and 30 (f) above, to maintain basic law and order and fight 
impunity and requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council 
any measures that may be adopted on this basis.140
The temporary measures have been used to initiate the creation of a Special Crimi-
nal Court with international judges to try ‘serious crimes, including serious viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian law, including conflict-related 
sexual violence as well as grave violations of the rights of the child, that constitute 
a threat to peace, stability or security’.141 Despite Russian criticism of the potential 
inefficiency and costliness of the Court, in June 2017 a Special Prosecutor and five 
judges were sworn in and in May 2018 the rules of procedure and evidence for the 
Court were adopted by the CAR parliament.142 The Court’s first session was held in 
October 2018.
Similarly, since 2014 MINUSMA has undertaken training and quick impact pro-
jects (QIPs) to improve the rule of law including the rehabilitation of courts and 
training of judges, magistrates, and local government officials.143 Alongside this 
MINUSMA has understood that ‘long-term reconciliation will not be possible 
without the promotion and defence of the human rights of all communities in the 
north’.144 The focus on human rights, both as a task to assist the Malian authori-
ties with and as a monitoring and reporting task for the UN, has since been carried 
over into each renewal of MINUSMA’s mandate.145 Issues in Mali remain however 
where, for example, large numbers of perpetrators of sexual violence are not pros-
ecuted despite MINUSMA following up repeatedly with the Malian authorities. 
Similarly, the trial of the leader of the 2012 coup, General Sanogo, for complicity in 
the killing of 21 soldiers is yet to be completed after numerous delays.
140 S/RES/2149 (n. 135), para. 40.
141 UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 19 December 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council’ (22 December 2014), S/2014/928, para. 63.
142 UN Security Council, 7901st Meeting (16 March 2017), S/PV.7901, p. 11 as per Mr. Iliichev; Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Central African Republic: Parliament Adopts Special Criminal Court Rules’ (4 June 
2018), https ://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/04/centr al-afric an-repub lic-parli ament -adopt s-speci al-crimi 
nal-court -rules .
143 S/2014/403 (n. 38), para. 28; UN Security Council, 7864th Meeting (18 January 2017), S/PV.7864, 
p. 9 as per Mr. Diop; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali’ 
(23 December 2014), S/2014/692, para. 24; UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Situation in Mali’ (28 September 2017), S/2017/811, para. 59.
144 UN Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali’ (10 June 2013), 
S/2013/338, para. 82.
145 S/RES/2227 (n. 81), para. 14(e); S/RES/2295 (n. 39), para. 19(f); S/RES/2364 (n. 18), para. 20(f).
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The work of MINUSCA and MINUSMA on human rights and extending the rule 
of law forms a crucial part of the UN’s emerging stabilization practice. Particularly 
in the CAR the UN has taken up the mantle of revitalising the justice system in the 
wake of widespread human rights abuses and sexual violence perpetrated through-
out the conflict. The mandate specifies the temporary measures used to establish 
the Special Criminal Court are used without establishing precedent.146 If the Court 
is effective the use of similar measures in future mandates could prove desirable as 
part of a stabilization strategy. Ending impunity is a way in which the UN Security 
Council can link the work of peace operations to wider agendas on international 
criminal justice and universal human rights. A focus on the rule of law and ending 
impunity could be a positive step for UN peace operations where missions can tap 
into the UN’s rich expertise in the area. However, if the UN wishes to continue this 
strategy the UN Security Council will need to pay close attention to the outcome of 
the approach taken in the CAR. It is important to note again that in Mali the MDSF 
have committed human rights violations during its counter-terror activities under-
mining work on the rule of law.147 In addition, detainees have also been released 
in an effort to reconcile differences, but some have questioned whether the justice 
system is credible. The UN will need to balance its support for the host state and 
counter-terror activities alongside its work on the rule of law and human rights to 
ensure the two areas are not in conflict.
4  Conclusion
This article has outlined a picture of what UN stabilization mandates include despite 
the UN Security Council not being sufficiently clear. The resulting strategy of clear-
ing an area of armed groups through the use of robust force to extend state authority 
and building peace in the vacuum left behind is not without its risks. It has been 
argued that the robust use of force in defence of the mandate strays into taking the 
initiative in the use of force and currently toes a fine line between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement. Furthermore, taking the initiative could lead to the intensifica-
tion of hostilities and ultimately the UN could be regarded as a party to the conflict 
under IHL. In the future, the UN Security Council will need to clarify its use of 
the term ‘robust’ and the UN should provide legal guidance on the consequences of 
robust force and support for the host state.
In the current climate, counter-terrorism is a hot topic which demands the UN’s 
attention. It is important that the UN responds to current needs to be as relevant 
as possible and at the moment that means having a response to global terrorism. 
However, it is suggested that if the UN Security Council wishes to engage further 
with counter-terrorism operations the UN will need to be cautious about supporting 
the activities of other international and regional operations and the effect the sup-
port has on competing pursuits, such as supporting national reconciliation. Oper-
ating alongside the host state is becoming a principal feature of stabilization and 
146 S/RES/2149 (n. 135), para. 40; S/RES/2301 (n. 18), para. 34(d)(i).
147 S/2016/498 (n. 104), para. 39.
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poses similar risks as counter-terrorism. Depending on the level of support provided 
the UN exposes itself to legal responsibility for wrongful acts committed by the 
host state. A documented consequence of the host state violating human rights, for 
instance, is that the population feels marginalised from the peace process. The situa-
tion in Mali in particular needs to be monitored closely with future research examin-
ing the effect of counter-terror efforts on the Malian peace process.
The thread which links the issues discussed above is how the UN will ensure har-
mony between the first stage of stabilization and the second. Under current practice 
competing interests in the mission mandates risk undermining each other. The focus 
of the missions above on the rule of law and using local-level peace initiatives to 
foster national reconciliation are positive developments in the mandating of opera-
tions. However, the UN will need to carefully consider how it wishes to proceed in 
future stabilization mandates to avoid a situation where fighting terrorists or work-
ing closely alongside the state frustrates efforts to build an inclusive peace. Particu-
larly in international law, the effects of these new mandates which include robust 
force and counter-terror cooperation are underexplored. Stabilization mandates will 
need further attention from international lawyers in the coming years if the UN con-
tinues along its current plotted course.
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